

# SUBSIDIZING BIOMASS COMBUSTION IN A CO-FIRING FOSSIL FUEL PLANT – The Effects on State Level Electricity Production and CO<sub>2</sub> -emissions

*Jussi Lintunen & Hanna-Liisa Kangas,  
Finnish Forest Research Institute*

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## BACKGROUND (1)

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- Pressure to increase RES-E production has increased globally
  - Yet, the RES-E technologies are still developing
- There is large scale production of electricity and CHP by fossil fuels
  - Remarkable potential to **increase** biomass use and **decrease** coal use (50-90 TWh in EU27) by co-combustion in existing power plants

## BACKGROUND (2)

- Criticism for biomass combustion subsidies in co-firing
    - ‘increased profitability of existing fossil power plants’
  - Biomass combustion in co-firing power plants has been treated differently in renewable electricity promoting policy schemes
- In this study, we calculate the impacts of that choice (implementation strategy)
- on the fuel uses, investment decisions, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and renewable electricity promoting policy instruments' values

# THE MODEL

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- **Three types of production:**
  - 1) Co-firing power plants - all the solid fossil fuel power plants are able to co-fire (biomass, coal and peat)
  - 2) Single fuel power plants (natural gas, oil)
  - 3) Wind power plants (onshore, offshore)
  
- **Hydro and nuclear power are exogenous**
  
- **Two time periods**
  - 1<sup>st</sup> period: current state
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> period: objective period
  
- **Four sub-periods**
  - peak, high, average and low demand
  
- **Investments increase the second period capacity**

# POLICIES (1)

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
- **Three policy instruments:**
  - Feed-in tariff (FIT)
  - Renewables subsidy (s)
  - CO<sub>2</sub> emissions price
- **Four policies:**
  - all the policies include CO<sub>2</sub> emissions price

| <b>Strategy:</b>                                 | <b>Instrument:</b><br>Feed-in tariff | <b>Instrument:</b><br>Renewables<br>subsidy |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| Biomass co-firing<br><b>is not</b><br>subsidized | NoCF, FIT                            | NoCF, s                                     |
| Biomass co-firing<br><b>is</b><br>subsidized     | YesCF, FIT                           | YesCF, s                                    |


## POLICIES (2)

- RES-E requirement of 30 %
  - Equal for feed-in tariff and renewables subsidy
  - The model calculates the *FIT* and *s* values that are needed to obtain the RES-E requirement
- The results are presented for 0-60 €/tCO<sub>2</sub> emissions price
- The numerical application is calculated for Finnish energy markets
  - The biomass is energywood


# RESULTS (1) - RES-E INSTRUMENTS



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


# RESULTS (1) RES-E - INSTRUMENTS




# RESULTS (2) - DEMAND & CO<sub>2</sub> INTENSITY


Electricity Demand




Carbon Intensity



# RESULTS (3) - FUEL USES



# RESULTS (4) WIND INVESTMENTS



# CONCLUSIONS (1)

- The inclusion of co-firing into RES-E promoting policy scheme:
  - **Increases** the utilization of biomass
  - **Lowers** investment levels into wind turbines
  - **Decreases** the tariff and subsidy values that are needed to reach the RES-E requirement
  - **Does not** systematically **increase** the carbon intensity of the power generation
- With two RES-E technologies it might be possible to find more efficient RES-E production allocations than with only one

## CONCLUSIONS (2)

- The differences between feed-in tariff and renewables subsidy:
  - Appear to be minimal when biomass co-firing **is not** subsidized
    - In wind power production, there is no production decision
  - Occur, when biomass co-firing **is** subsidized
    - Biomass is an almost perfect substitute for peat and a substitute for coal
    - The input/production decisions vary between instruments
    - The feed-in tariff prevents the pass-through effects of climate policy from subsidized RES-E producers

THANK YOU!

# APPENDIX

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# LITERATURE

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- The study combines/extends two previous studies:
  - 1) Fisher & Newell. 2008. Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation. JEEM.
    - The impacts of different policies in two period electricity market model. No co-firing power plants.
  - 2) Kangas, Lintunen & Uusivuori. 2009. The co-firing problem of a power plant under policy regulations. EP.
    - The endogenous fuel-mix choice of a co-firing power plant. Exogenous energy markets.

# THE MODEL - CO-FIRING POWER PLANTS

- The co-firing plant makes a fuel mix, production and investment decision:

$$\Pi^{cf}(\mathbf{x}, I) = \sum_{t \in \{0,1\}} H_t \delta^t \left( \sum_{\tau=1}^4 [R_{\tau t}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}) - TC_{\tau t}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t})] \omega_{\tau} \right) - c^{inv}(I)$$

|   |  |
|---|--|
| $\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}$   | Fuel mix   |
| $t, \tau$   | Period, sub-period   |
| $H_t$   | Hours/period   |
| $\delta = 1 / (1 + r)$  | Discount factor  |
| $\omega_{\tau}$   | Weight of sub-period $\sum_{\tau} \omega_{\tau} = 1$   |
| $R_{\tau t}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}) = \sum_{i \in Y} p_{i\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}) \eta_i \sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau t}$ | Revenues, $i \in Y = \{el, heat\}$ , $p_{i\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t})$ effective price, $\eta_i$ efficiency |
| $TC_{\tau t}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}) = C_{\tau t}(\mathbf{x}_{\tau t}) + \sum_{f \in F} p_t^{ec} \varepsilon_f x_{f\tau t}$    | Total costs (production and emissions costs)   |
| $c^{inv}(I)$  | Investment costs   |

# THE MODEL - CO-FIRING POWER PLANTS

- Co-firing costs:
  - Technically optimal biomass ratio  $\sigma_{bio}$ 
    - FBC: positive; PF: zero or negative
  - Assumed to be quadratic around technical optimum
- Substitutability of fuels varies with biomass ratio

$$C^{co} \left( \frac{x_{bio,\tau t}}{\sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau t}} - \sigma_{bio} \right)^2 \sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau t}$$

# THE MODEL - CO-FIRING POWER PLANTS

- The optimization is restricted by period-wise capacity constraints

$$X_{max} \geq \sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau 0} \quad \forall \tau \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

and

$$X_{max} + I \geq \sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau 1} \quad \forall \tau \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

# THE MODEL - SINGLE FUEL PLANTS

- The single fuel power plant makes a fuel use and investment decision
- The plants are aggregated through their efficiency coefficients

$$\Pi^s(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{t \in \{0,1\}} H_t \delta^t \left( \sum_{\tau=1}^4 \left[ \sum_{i \in Y} p_{i\tau t} \int_0^{x_{\tau t}} \eta_i(X) dX - TC_{\tau t}(x_{\tau t}) \right] \omega_{\tau} \right)$$

- The amount of output generated

$$q_i(x) = \int_0^x \eta_i(X) dX$$

# THE MODEL – EFFICIENCY AGGREGATION

- Efficiency function:  $\eta_i(X)$ 
  - Represents efficiency coefficients of the aggregate
  - Locus approximated by a differentiable function
  - Merit order assumption: decreasing in  $X$
  - Linear efficiency function  $\leftrightarrow$  quadratic costs
- Investments:
  - Specific technology (constant efficiency)

# THE MODEL - WIND POWER PLANTS

- No production decision
  - the investments on new capacity are optimized

$$\Pi^{wind}(I) = \sum_{t \in \{0,1\}} H_t \delta^t \left( \sum_{\tau=1}^4 \omega_{\tau} R_{\tau}^{wind} - C_t^{wind} \right) K_t(I) - c^{inv}(I)$$

# POLICIES

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## ■ RES-E policy instruments:

### 1) Feed-in tariff (FIT)

- Co-firing power plant 
$$p_{el,\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}) = p_{el,\tau t} + \frac{x_{bio,\tau t}}{\sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau t}} \max\{0, p_{fit,t} - p_{el,\tau t}\}$$
- Wind power plant 
$$p_{el,\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}) = p_{el,\tau t} + \max\{0, p_{fit,t} - p_{el,\tau t}\}$$

### 2) Renewables subsidy (s)

- Co-firing power plant 
$$p_{el,\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}) = p_{el,\tau t} + \frac{x_{bio,\tau t}}{\sum_{f \in F} x_{f\tau t}} s_t$$
- Wind power plant 
$$p_{el,\tau t}^{eff}(\mathbf{x}) = p_{el,\tau t} + s_t$$